Malicious software supply chain attacks surged +156.0% as over 245,000 malicious packages were removed from npm and PyPI, open-source libraries compose 82.0% of enterprise application codebases, 52.0% of critical open-source tools rely on only 1 or 2 maintainers, and supply chain breaches average $4.63 million in damages. While typosquatting represents 64% of malicious packages and 74% attempt to steal developer AWS/SSH credentials, 54% of enterprises mandate automated SBOM generation in CI/CD and only 16% of tech companies sponsor open source. The figures below come from empirical research published by Sonatype, Synopsys, Linux Foundation, Harvard University LISH, Snyk, and IBM Security.
TL;DR
- Malicious software supply chain attacks targeting open-source registries surged +156.0% year-over-year (Sonatype)
- Over 245,000 malicious open-source packages were identified and neutralized across npm, PyPI, and RubyGems
- 82.0% of all code in modern enterprise proprietary application codebases consists of open-source dependencies (Synopsys)
- 64.0% of malicious supply chain packages exploit typosquatting or dependency confusion mimicking famous package names
- 22.0% of supply chain compromises occur when attackers hijack legitimate maintainer accounts via credential stuffing
- A single direct open-source package declaration pulls in an average of 86 indirect transitive dependencies (OpenSSF)
- 54.0% of enterprise software engineering organizations mandate automated machine-readable SBOM generation in CI/CD
- 76.0% of software vendors selling to the US Federal Government comply with mandatory Executive Order 14028 SBOM rules
- 62.0% of open-source dependencies deployed in enterprise production code are more than two major versions outdated
- An enterprise data breach originating from a compromised software supply chain costs an average of $4.63 million (IBM)
- It takes software engineering teams an average of 26.0 days to detect an injected malicious dependency in production
- 52.0% of critical open-source software libraries underpinning global IT infrastructure rely on only 1 or 2 maintainers
- 74.0% of malicious packages attempt to exfiltrate local developer environment variables, AWS tokens, and SSH keys
1. Attack Surge: +156% Growth and 245k Malicious Packages
Adversaries have shifted focus from attacking hardened production firewalls to poisoning the upstream open-source packages consumed by developers. Attacks surged +156.0% YoY.
Registry poisoning: 245,000+ malicious packages were removed from npm/PyPI (Sonatype), impacting codebases where 82.0% of lines are open-source (Synopsys).
| Metric | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Annual growth rate of malicious software supply chain attacks targeting open-source package repositories (npm, PyPI, Maven, RubyGems) | +156.0% annual increase in open-source software supply chain attacks | Sonatype State of the Software Supply Chain / OpenSSF |
| Total malicious packages discovered and removed across open-source package registries (npm, PyPI) in 2025/2026 | 245,000+ malicious open-source packages identified and neutralized | Sonatype Repository Health Telemetry / Socket.dev |
| Share of enterprise proprietary application codebases composed of third-party open-source libraries and dependencies | 82.0% of modern enterprise application code consists of open-source dependencies | Synopsys Open Source Security and Risk Analysis (OSSRA) Report |
CVE vulnerability remediation and patch cycles connect to our cve vulnerability statistics. Source: Sonatype State of the Software Supply Chain.
2. Attack Vectors & Transitive Sprawl: 64% Typosquatting and 86 Transitive Deps
Deep dependency trees create invisible attack surfaces where developers unknowingly import hundreds of unvetted sub-libraries. Direct imports pull in 86 transitive packages.
Typosquatting: 64.0% of malware uses misspelled package names (Linux Foundation), while 22.0% of breaches stem from compromised maintainer accounts (Socket.dev).
| Metric | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
Top open-source attack vector: Typosquatting and Dependency Confusion attacks mimicking popular package names (e.g., lodashe vs lodash) | 64.0% of malicious supply chain packages exploit typosquatting or brandjacking | Linux Foundation / Sonatype Threat Research |
| Developer account takeover (ATO): malicious package versions published after maintainer npm/PyPI accounts were compromised via phishing or credential stuffing | 22.0% of supply chain compromises result from hijacked maintainer credentials | Socket.dev State of Open Source Security |
| Transitive dependency risk: average number of secondary/tertiary indirect open-source dependencies pulled into a single web application project | 86 average transitive dependencies pulled in per direct npm/Python dependency declared | Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) Benchmark |
Data breach forensics and credential hijacking connect to our data breach statistics. Source: Socket.dev State of Open Source.
3. SBOM Adoption & Federal Mandates: 54% SBOMs and 76% Federal Compliance
Generating machine-readable Software Bills of Materials (CycloneDX, SPDX) allows security teams to query their global inventory instantly when new zero-days break. 54.0% mandate SBOMs in CI/CD.
Federal standards: 76.0% of federal vendors supply validated SBOMs (CISA/EO 14028), despite 62.0% of enterprise production dependencies lagging versions behind.
| Metric | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) adoption: enterprise engineering organizations generating automated machine-readable SBOMs (CycloneDX, SPDX) | 54.0% of enterprise software development teams mandate automated SBOM generation in CI/CD | Linux Foundation State of Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) |
| Federal SBOM compliance: vendors selling software to the US Federal Government complying with Executive Order 14028 / NIST SP 800-218 (SSDF) | 76.0% of federal enterprise software contractors supply validated SBOM artifacts | CISA Secure Software Development Guidelines / GAO |
| Outdated open-source component lag: enterprise applications running open-source components that are more than 2 major versions behind latest releases | 62.0% of open-source dependencies in enterprise production code are outdated | Sonatype State of the Software Supply Chain |
Zero Trust architecture and software provenance connect to our zero trust security statistics. Source: Linux Foundation State of SBOM.
4. Breach Costs & Detection Lag: $4.63M Breach Damages and 26-Day MTTD
Injected backdoors execute silently within trusted build environments, exfiltrating intellectual property before discovery. Supply chain breaches cost $4.63 million.
Detection delay: engineering teams take 26.0 days to detect rogue packages (Snyk), while 38.0% of top packages now adopt cryptographic Sigstore signed provenance.
| Metric | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Average cost of a software supply chain data breach: financial loss incurred by organizations when third-party software code is compromised | $4.63 Million average data breach cost for incidents originating in the software supply chain | IBM Security Cost of a Data Breach Report |
| Mean time to detect (MTTD) malicious package injection: average time required for engineering teams to detect a malicious dependency in production | 26.0 days average time to detect a malicious third-party dependency in production builds | Snyk State of Open Source Security |
| Package signing and provenance adoption: open-source packages signed using cryptographic Sigstore / cosign digital provenance attestations | 38.0% of top 10,000 npm and PyPI packages provide verifiable Sigstore provenance | OpenSSF Scorecards / Sigstore Telemetry |
Ransomware extortion tactics and attack vectors connect to our ransomware statistics. Source: IBM Security Cost of a Data Breach.
5. Maintainer Fragility & Key Theft: 52% Solo Maintainers and 74% Credential Exfil
The global digital economy relies heavily on critical software infrastructure maintained by solitary, unpaid volunteer developers. 52.0% of critical OSS tools have <=2 maintainers.
Targeted payloads: 74.0% of malicious packages steal developer environment variables (DataDog), while only 16.0% of enterprise tech companies sponsor open source (Tidelift).
| Metric | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Maintainer burnout and single-point-of-failure: share of critical open-source software libraries maintained by only 1 or 2 unpaid volunteer developers | 52.0% of critical open-source libraries rely on only 1 or 2 core maintainers | Harvard University Laboratory for Innovation Science (LISH) / Linux Foundation |
| Open-source security funding: corporate engineering organizations that financially contribute or sponsor the open-source libraries they consume | 16.0% of enterprise software companies financially support the open-source projects in their tech stack | Tidelift State of Open Source Maintainers Survey |
| Malicious payload behavior: primary malicious action executed by infected npm/PyPI packages (crypto mining, credential harvesting, reverse shells) | 74.0% of malicious open-source packages attempt to exfiltrate developer environment variables and AWS/SSH keys | DataDog Security Research / Sonatype |
API security key exposure and secrets sprawl connect to our api security statistics. Source: Harvard University LISH Census.
6. CI/CD Pipeline Attacks & SCA Tooling: 28% Pipeline Attacks and 84% SCA
Attackers increasingly exploit misconfigured GitHub Actions workflows and build runners to inject compiler backdoors. 28.0% of attacks target CI/CD pipelines.
Automated analysis: 84.0% of engineering teams deploy automated SCA tools (Gartner), reducing dependency patch release timelines to 28.0 days (Veracode).
| Metric | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| CI/CD pipeline compromise: attacks targeting GitHub Actions workflows, build runners, and solarwinds-style compiler tampering | 28.0% of software supply chain incidents target CI/CD build automation pipelines directly | Aqua Security Software Supply Chain Threat Report |
| Software Composition Analysis (SCA) tooling adoption: engineering teams deploying automated SCA scanning tools (Snyk, Sonatype, Dependabot) | 84.0% of enterprise development teams utilize automated SCA dependency scanners | Gartner Magic Quadrant for Application Security Testing |
| Vulnerability remediation timeline: time taken by enterprise engineering teams to patch a newly published critical CVE in an open-source library | 28.0 days average time to test and deploy patched open-source library updates to production | Veracode State of Software Security |
Summary: Software Supply Chain by the Numbers
| Metric | Value | Primary Source |
|---|---|---|
| Surge in open-source supply chain attacks YoY | +156.0% YoY increase | Sonatype Supply Chain Report |
| Malicious packages neutralized across npm/PyPI | 245,000+ packages | Sonatype / Socket.dev |
| Open-source code share in enterprise codebases | 82.0% open-source code | Synopsys OSSRA Report |
| Malicious packages using typosquatting/brandjacking | 64.0% typosquatting | Linux Foundation / Sonatype |
| Supply chain compromises via hijacked maintainers | 22.0% compromised logins | Socket.dev Security Report |
| Average transitive dependencies per direct import | 86 transitive packages | OpenSSF Benchmark |
| Enterprises generating automated SBOMs in CI/CD | 54.0% mandate SBOMs | Linux Foundation SBOM Study |
| Federal software vendors supplying validated SBOMs | 76.0% federal compliance | CISA / OMB EO 14028 |
| Production dependencies running outdated versions | 62.0% outdated versions | Sonatype Supply Chain |
| Average cost of a software supply chain breach | $4.63 Million / breach | IBM Cost of Data Breach |
| Time to detect malicious package in production | 26.0 days MTTD | Snyk State of Open Source |
| Top packages providing Sigstore signed provenance | 38.0% signed provenance | OpenSSF Scorecards |
| Critical open-source libraries with <=2 maintainers | 52.0% solo/duo maintainers | Harvard LISH / Linux Fdn |
| Enterprises financially supporting open source | 16.0% sponsor OSS | Tidelift Maintainer Survey |
| Malicious packages exfiltrating developer env keys | 74.0% steal env/SSH keys | DataDog / Sonatype |
Methodology and Sources
The statistics in this report were compiled from annual repository threat telemetry from Sonatype and Socket.dev, open-source risk audits from Synopsys and the Linux Foundation, academic infrastructure censuses from Harvard University Laboratory for Innovation Science (LISH), maintainer economic surveys from Tidelift, and financial breach impact studies from IBM Security.
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Sonatype & Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF): State of the Software Supply Chain: 245k Malicious Packages and Maintainer Attacks (+156% attacks, 245k packages, 64% typosquatting).
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Synopsys & Linux Foundation: Open Source Security and Risk Analysis (OSSRA) and State of SBOM Adoption (82% open-source code, 54% SBOM mandate, 76% federal compliance).
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Harvard University (LISH) & Tidelift: Vulnerabilities in the Core: Census of Open Source Infrastructure and Maintainer Economics (52% solo/duo maintainers, 16% corporate sponsorship).
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Socket.dev & Snyk: State of Open Source Security: Transitive Dependencies, Maintainer ATO, and 26-Day MTTD (86 transitive deps, 22% maintainer ATO, 26d MTTD).
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IBM Security & Aqua Security: Cost of a Data Breach Report: Software Supply Chain Financial Damages and CI/CD Exploits ($4.63M supply chain breach cost, 74% env key theft).
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Data watch: Software supply chain statistics reflect open-source package repositories (npm, PyPI, Maven, Go, Cargo), Software Composition Analysis (SCA), SBOM generation, and CI/CD build security. Physical hardware supply chain manufacturing is categorized separately.
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Last updated: August 2026. This roundup is updated quarterly as Sonatype State of the Supply Chain, Synopsys OSSRA digests, and OpenSSF security metrics are published.